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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
RAWLS AND THE LAW
Ronald Dworkin*
I. RAWLS AS LEGAL PHILOSOPHER
It is a mark of John Rawls's greatness as a political philosopher that
my topic, "Rawls and the Law," can be approached in so many ways.
Politicians around the world cite his ideas and American and other
judges appeal to his work, so we might talk about the impact that he
has already had on the law in different countries. Or we might
consider the impact that he might have: We might ask what changes
in American tax or tort law his famous difference principle would
recommend, for example. Those are indeed among the issues that will
be explored tomorrow. We might also examine his impact in the
other direction. We might speculate about how important it was to
the shape of Rawls's theory of justice that he lived and worked in a
political community as dominated by law as ours is, and in which
certain crucial political issues-matters of basic liberty and
constitutional essentials, if you will-are removed from ordinary
politics and made the special concern of courts.
I plan to talk about Rawls and the law in a different way: about
Rawls as himself a legal philosopher and, indeed, lawyer. He did not
suppose himself a legal philosopher, and though there are several
important discussions of law in his work, some of which I will
mention, he made his main contributions to legal theory through his
political philosophy, because legal theory is a department of political
philosophy and Rawls wrote abstractly about the whole discipline. In
these keynote remarks, I want briefly to identify but also to evaluate
those aspects of Rawls's theory of justice that speak directly to
traditional issues of jurisprudence.
I will begin with a short list of those traditional issues. Any general
legal theory must answer the ancient question of what law is. But that
ancient question in fact poses two different issues. The first is
methodological: What kind of theory counts as an answer to that
question? Are general theories of law descriptive theories? If so,
* This Lecture represents a lightly edited and footnoted version of the Keynote
Address Professor Dworkin delivered on November 7, 2003 at the Fordham
University School of Law conference, "Rawls and the Law."
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what do they describe? Are they pieces of conceptual analysis? If so,
what makes one analysis of the concept of law better than another?
Are they normative political theories? If so, then how does a theory
of what law is differ from a theory about what law should be? Legal
philosophers disagree about these methodological matters. What
view, if any, follows from Rawls's philosophy?
The second question is then obvious. Once a legal theory has taken
a position about the methodological issue, it must try to answer the
substantive one. Given what a theory of law should be, which theory
of law is the most successful? For some time, theories of law have
been divided, by both their authors and commentators, into roughly
two groups: positivist theories of law, which insist that what the law of
any jurisdiction requires or permits is only a matter of social fact, and
anti-positivist theories, which claim that what the law requires
sometimes depends not on social facts alone but also on controversial
normative issues including moral issues. Rawls did not, so far as I
know, explicitly choose one or another of these general positions as
his own. But do his theories support one choice rather than the
other?
That second question inevitably presents a third one. On either a
positivist or an anti-positivist theory, a judge will often face "hard"
cases in which what lawyers regard as settled law does not decide the
immediate issue. Positivists say that in such a case a judge must
exercise discretion to make new law. Anti-positivists describe the
same necessity in different ways: A lawyer who thinks, as I do, that
judges must aim at integrity in their decisions will agree that what
integrity requires will often, perhaps usually, be controversial, so that
a fresh judgment is needed. Both sides, or rather all versions of each
side, must confront the question of what sorts or sources of argument
are appropriate to that judicial responsibility.
What kinds of reasons may or should judges offer to defend their
fresh judgments? May they appeal to religious convictions? To their
personal moral convictions? To philosophical systems of morality or
eschatology? To macroeconomic phenomena-would it be a good
argument for a judge to say that he is deciding in a particular way
because that will help the dollar on the international currency
markets? These crucial questions are relatively neglected in legal
theory. But Rawls developed a doctrine, which he called the doctrine
of public reason, about the arguments public officials may properly
use to justify their decisions, and he said emphatically that the
doctrine of public reason applies with particular stringency to judges.
We must examine this doctrine. If we find it unsatisfactory, as I
suspect it is, then we must ask whether any other part of Rawls's
general theory is more helpful in defining the character of proper
judicial reasoning.
The fourth issue is particularly pressing for legal theorists in
1388 [Vol. 72
RAWLS & THE LAW
America and in other mature democracies where constitutional courts
have the power to invalidate laws adopted by legislators elected by
and accountable to the people. Is that power consistent with
democratic principles? If not, is it unjust for that reason? Rawls
spoke directly to that issue, on different occasions, and we must notice
what he said. But he recently spoke to what is in many ways an even
livelier and more important issue, a matter, we might say, of
constitutional strategy rather than legitimacy. Should a constitutional
court decline to decide certain issues-for example, about abortion or
assisted suicide-because its nation is not ready for a judicial
resolution of the issue? Should the Court stay its hand to allow
ordinary politics to reduce the issue's divisiveness and perhaps reach a
compromise more acceptable to the whole community? Several
prominent legal scholars have endorsed that suggestion, and Rawls
has said that he thinks their argument a "good" one. We should
consider why he thinks their argument good.
Finally, I would like to touch on what might seem a much more
abstract issue. Can controversial claims about what the law requires
be objectively rather than merely subjectively true? This is not an
issue that troubles lawyers and judges in their day-to-day practice. It
nevertheless has considerable practical importance, because many
issues of legal and civic policy turn on it, including whether the rule of
law really is different from rule by men and women with power,
whether it makes sense to suppose that we have a general moral
obligation to obey the law, and whether judicial review of legislative
enactments really is legitimate. Some legal theories are in fact built
around the supposition that legal practice is essentially subjective: for
example, the influential movement called American legal realism,
which in our time morphed into the incandescent, though brief,
fireworks of critical legal studies. Rawls said a good deal about truth
and objectivity, some of it inconclusive and even obscure, but much of
it helpful when lawyers turn to these more explicitly philosophical
issues.
II. THE NATURE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Assume, for the moment, as almost all lawyers do, that a
proposition about legal rights and duties can be true. If so, then a
theory of law should tell us under what circumstances such a
proposition is true. What in the world can make it true, for example,
that the speed limit around here is 55, or that Microsoft violated the
antitrust laws, or that affirmative action is unconstitutional? Legal
philosophers defend general theories of law that attempt answers to
that question. Legal positivists claim that a proposition of law can be
true only in virtue of social facts: facts, for example, about what a
legislature has declared or a judge decided in some prior case. I shall
say something about the merits of that view in a moment, but we must
2004] 1389
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first consider an antecedent question. What kind of a claim are they,
the positivists, making? What could make their claim about the truth
conditions of law itself true?
Many legal philosophers believe that their theories of law are
descriptive theories about the social practices or conventions that the
bulk of lawyers follow in making, defending, and judging propositions
of law. Of course, lawyers often disagree about which legal
propositions are true and which false. They disagree, for example,
about the legal position of a woman who has suffered side effects from
a drug that her mother had taken many years prior, but who cannot
identify the manufacturer of the particular pharmaceuticals her
mother had taken at any particular time because the pill was
manufactured by several companies and she does not know whose pill
she took when.1 Is she legally entitled to recover damages from all of
the companies that manufacture the drug in proportion to their
market share? But these legal philosophers assume that if this kind of
disagreement is genuine, then the lawyers must agree about a more
basic issue. They must agree on the right tests to use to decide if a
proposition of law is true; otherwise-if different lawyers used
different tests-they would simply be talking past one another. If that
assumption is correct, then a philosophical theory of law should aim to
describe that background agreement. It should tell us what law is by
telling us what tests lawyers actually use to identify true or sound
propositions of law.
On this view, legal philosophy is best understood as a descriptive
exercise: it is an exercise in legal sociology. But, in fact, it is
extremely difficult to account for any general theory of law if we take
it to be descriptive in that way. Consider the version of legal
positivism developed by H.L.A. Hart.2 He argued for what he called
the "sources" thesis which holds (in substance) that propositions of
law are true when, but only When, they can be inferred from explicit
decisions taken by legal institutions, like legislatures, that are
authorized by convention to make such decisions.' If a lawyer can
show that it follows from something that the pertinent legislature has
said that the woman in our example is legally entitled to market-share
damages, then he has shown that she is so entitled. But if that
proposition does not follow from anything any authorized institution
has said or done, then it is not true.
In a posthumously published postscript to his book, The Concept of
Law, Hart insisted that this sources thesis is purely descriptive.4 But it
is mysterious in what sense it could be thought descriptive. Hart did
not intend it, he insisted, as a description of how lawyers talk, how
1. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980).
2. See infra text accompanying note 4.
3. See infra text accompanying note 4.
4. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law vii (6th prtg. 1972).
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they use the word "law." For it is plainly not part of the very meaning
of "law" that law can only be valid in virtue of positive enactment.
Nor could he have intended it as a description of what all lawyers
accept as belonging to the very concept of law, as we accept that it
belongs to the concept of bachelor that a bachelor is unmarried. For
lawyers disagree about whether the sources thesis is right: The
lawyers who think that the woman in our example has a legal right to
market-share damages plainly reject the sources thesis, because no
institution had declared such liability before imaginative lawyers5
argued for it. If these lawyers are mistaken, their mistake is a legal
not a conceptual one. Nor, for the same reason, could Hart have
meant his sources thesis as the sociological hypothesis that lawyers
everywhere actually claim law on their side only when the sources
thesis has been satisfied. That hypothesis, too, is plainly false.
How, then, should we understand a theory of law like the sources
thesis? Rawls spoke directly to that issue by example-through his
analysis of the concept of justice. He did not suppose that everyone
who shares and uses the concept of justice shares some substantial
background understanding about what makes an institution just or
unjust. On the contrary, he insisted that people have radically
different conceptions of justice. They do, he allowed, share some very
abstract understanding that makes these all, conceptions of justice
rather than of some other virtue. But this shared understanding is
exceedingly thin, all but empty of real content. What makes
disagreement about justice possible is that people sufficiently agree on
certain specific instances or examples -everyone agrees that slavery is
unjust, that wage exploitation is unjust, and so forth. So Rawls
recommended that philosophers of justice engage in the interpretive
enterprise he called seeking reflective equilibrium. We try to generate
principles of some general scope and to match those general principles
to the concrete judgments about what is just and unjust with which we
begin, shifting our views about either principles or concrete
judgments, or both, as becomes necessary to achieve an interpretive
fit.
We can restate this interpretive exercise as a method for legal
philosophy. We can identify what apparently goes without saying is
part of our law-the speed limit, the tax code, the ordinary everyday
rules of property, contract, and so forth, that we are all familiar with.
These are, we might say, paradigm instances of law. And then we can
construct the other pole of an interpretive equilibrium because we
share an abstract ideal that can play the same role in legal theory as
5. These lawyers were themselves inspired with the idea for market-share
liability by a student Comment published by the Fordham Law Review, which is
coincidentally the institutional sponsor of this symposium. See Naomi Sheiner,
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev.
963 (1978).
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the concept of justice played for Rawls. This is the concept of law-
though sometimes, when we are emphasizing its political character, we
describe it in another way, as the concept of legality or the concept of
the rule of law. We can then try to provide a suitable conception of
legality, that is, a conception of legality that brings our various pre-
analytic assumptions about concrete propositions of law into
equilibrium with the general principles of political morality that seem
best to explain the character and value of legality. In that way we can
embed a theory about the truth conditions of propositions of law in a
larger conception of value that we find convincing. A positivist theory
of law will offer a thesis about the truth conditions of such
propositions, like the sources thesis, that is supported by a positivist
conception of legality that is in turn supported by an appropriate more
general theory of justice. That interpretive design provides the best
way of understanding the arguments that leading legal philosophers
have actually made. Legal philosophy so conceived is in a way
descriptive because it begins with some understanding about what is
taken for granted within the community to which it is addressed, but it
is in other ways substantive and normative because the equilibrium it
seeks is with principles judged for independent appeal. So Rawls's
work is, right from the start, a major contribution to legal philosophy's
self-understanding.
III. WHAT IS LAW?
Now let us turn to the substantive side of the ancient question.
Which understanding of law-a positivist understanding or some
other-is most successful as a conception of the concept of legality?
To bring out the implications of Rawls's ideas for that further
question, we might embed the question in his imaginary construction
of justice as fairness. Suppose that the representatives in the "original
position"6 he described are asked to choose, in addition to general
principles of justice, a conception of legality as well. They are offered,
to make the point simpler, a menu of only two choices. They may
choose a simplified positivist account of legality, which specifies that
judges use a particular test for true propositions of law, or a simplified
interpretivist non-positivist account.
On the stipulated simple positivist account, judges are to enforce
rules laid down by the legislature so far as these rules are
unambiguous or can be made unambiguous by consulting legislative
history and other standard sources of legislative intent. But when, as
will often happen, rules laid down and interpreted only in that way are
insufficient to decide the case, then judges should announce that the
law provides no answer, and then legislate themselves to fill the gap so
created. They should legislate, however, modestly and marginally,
6. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 15-19 (rev. ed. 1999).
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and as they believe that the legislature now in power would legislate if
seized of the issue. Judges should do, that is, what they think the
pertinent parliament would have done. On the rival simple
interpretivist account, judges should enforce rules laid down by the
legislature, interpreted in the same way, but when confronted by a so-
called gap, should not attempt to legislate as the legislature would, but
should instead try to identify the principles of fairness or justice that
best justify the law of the community as a whole and apply those
principles to the new case.
Now suppose that, contrary to Rawls's supposition, the
representatives have settled on a general, all-embracing utilitarian
conception of justice. Then they will think that they have a strong
case for choosing the simplified positivist conception of law over the
simplified non-positivist one. For there is a strong affinity between a
utilitarian conception of justice and a positivist conception of legality:
It is no accident that the two founders of modern legal positivism,
Bentham and Austin, were arch utilitarians. As Bentham pointed out,
sound utilitarian legislation must be organized and directed from a
single source: The best program for maximizing utility is an
integrated program in which different laws and policies can be
tweaked and coordinated so as to yield a maximum utility bang.7 The
legislature is the best institution for achieving that maximum bang,
because it can survey the whole architecture of law and policy, and
because its composition and procedures of election are conducive to
providing information about the mix of preferences in the community
that is indispensable to sound calculations of the trade-offs necessary
to achieve maximum aggregate utility. Judges are essential to the
retail enforcement of rules designed to maximize utility over time, but
they should be as little as possible architects of policy, because that
would be multiply inefficient. So they should be told that when the
legislature's dictum has run out without issuing a decision, they should
declare there is no law controlling their decisions that comes from any
other source. They should announce a gap, which they then fill as
modestly as possible, as lieutenants of their political masters, in the
spirit of what those masters would themselves do, going, as the arch-
positivist and -utilitarian Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, from the
molar to the molecular.8
That is the positive case for positivism from the utilitarian
perspective. There is a corresponding negative case from that
perspective against interpretivism: that it is irrational. For
utilitarians, moral and political principles are simply rules of thumb
7. See generally Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation (1879).
8. See So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.").
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for achieving maximum utility in the long run, and there can be no
independent value, and much mischief, in pursuing a coherence of
principle for its own sake. Utility is surely better served by
concentrating on the future alone, with no backward glance at
integrity with the past, except so far as this is in itself strategically
wise.
Now suppose, however, that representatives in the original position
do choose as Rawls supposes they would. They reject utilitarianism in
favor of the two principles of justice, one of which gives priority to
certain basic liberties and the other of which seeks to protect the
position of the worst-off group in society. Then it would seem natural
for them also to choose interpretivism over positivism, because
interpretivism would then be a better bet to achieve justice, at retail as
well as wholesale, in the long run. The two principles require
implementation at successive levels of detail. They require, first, a
constitutional stage at which institutions are designed so as most likely
to produce the outcomes that the two basic principles demand. Then
they require those institutions to make, at what Rawls calls a
legislative stage, more specific decisions about laws and policies
guided by more specific principles of justice in service of the basic
principles. People who place a lexical priority on equal liberty, and
then a further priority on protecting the position of the worse-off
group, will be particularly sensitive to the possibility of slippage at this
legislative stage. They will worry that a legislature dependent on
majority approval will be under great pressure to advance the
interests of some groups at the expense of others. They will,
therefore, be attracted to the idea of a judiciary with independent
powers and responsibilities. They will be drawn to the idea of judicial
review of a written Constitution, and I will discuss the implications of
Rawls's arguments on that score later.9 But they will also be drawn to
the idea that judges should also exercise a less potent, but still
important, supervision over the application and development of the
more quotidian law made by legislatures. And to the further idea that
they should exercise that power in the direction of equality before the
law, that is, in the direction of insisting that, so far as a reasonable
doctrine of legislative supremacy permits, whatever principles are
presupposed by what the legislature has done for some groups be
available generally to all. They will have that strong reason for
favoring an interpretivist conception of law that deems people to have
legal rights not only to what legislative institutions have specifically
directed, but also to the principled elaboration of those directions.
Coherence is the best protection against discrimination. That is, after
all, the premise of the Equal Protection Clause of our own
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment.
9. See infra Part V.
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Rawls did not make this argument for interpretivism; indeed, so far
as I am aware, he made no explicit argument for any conception of
law. But he did explicitly endorse the principle that I said supports
interpretivism, and he endorsed that principle in the course of a
discussion of legality or the rule of law. Let me quote:
[T]he precept that like decisions be given in like cases significantly
limits the discretion of judges and others in authority. The precept
forces them to justify the distinctions that they make between
persons by reference to the relevant legal rules and principles. In
any particular case, if the rules are at all complicated and call for
interpretation, it may be easy to justify an arbitrary decision. But as
the number of cases increases, plausible justifications for biased
judgments become more difficult to construct. The requirement of
consistency holds of course for the interpretation of all rules and for
justifications at all levels.10
Note Rawls's emphasis on complexity as itself a constraint, and his
insistence that consistency hold, as he put it, for "all rules ... at all
levels."11  Citizens are best protected from arbitrariness and
discrimination when judges interpreting the law and elaborating it in
hard cases are responsible for coherence, not simply with particular
doctrines here and there, but, as best as it can be achieved, principled
coherence with the whole structure of law.
Now it might be objected that in spite of the historical affinity I
cited a positivist need not be a utilitarian. We can suppose, instead, a
positivist judge who is not a utilitarian, and who stands ready, in cases
in which he supposes he has discretion, to adopt the rule that he
believes best comports with justice on some other understanding.
Why wouldn't people who have chosen Rawls's two principles of
justice in the original position also choose that characterization of a
judge's role? Why isn't that a better choice on grounds of what Rawls
called imperfect procedural justice? But this suggestion neglects the
fact that judges, even if they aim only at justice, will nevertheless often
disagree about what justice is, and that judges may themselves be
influenced by preconception, prejudice, or the other enemies of
impartial justice. People choosing a conception of law have no reason
to think that a decision in their own case will better reflect justice, on
any conception of what that is, if judges are free to disregard
principled coherence with what other officials and judges have done
than if they are asked to respect principled coherence. They might
well think that they safeguard themselves better against arbitrariness
or discrimination if they do not instruct judges to do justice as they see
it, but seek to discipline judges by insisting that they do their best to
10. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, at 209.
11. Id.
2004] 1395
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
respect principled consistency as they see it. That is, as I said, the
assumption of our Equal Protection Clause. 12
IV. THE CONSTRAINTS OF LEGAL REASONING
Now I turn to a more specific question that must be faced by all
conceptions of law, but which is particularly difficult for some. How
should judges reason in hard cases? Under the simple package of
positivism and utilitarianism that I described, judges must make fresh
judgments to fill gaps in the law, but the package dictates the
character of that judicial reasoning. It holds that judges should try to
do what the legislature would have done. Interpretivism, as well as
other legal theories, also supposes that judges must make fresh
judgments of political morality in hard cases: It instructs them to seek
an interpretive equilibrium between the legal structure as a whole and
the general principles that are best understood as justifying that
structure. That, as I have argued elsewhere, is in fact the traditional
common law method. 3 But are there any constraints on what kind of
principles judges can cite in constructing this interpretive equilibrium,
that is, in justifying the law's record as a whole?
It would certainly seem wrong for them to deploy certain kinds of
arguments. They must not appeal to their personal interests or to the
interests of some group to which they are connected. That obvious
constraint seems part of the very idea of a justification. But may they
appeal to their religious convictions, if they have any, or to the
doctrines of their church, if they have one? After all, some judges
think, as a matter of their deepest conviction, that religion provides
the most compelling or perhaps the only true justification of political
morality and, therefore, the most compelling or only true justification
of past legal decisions. In the United States, religious argument might
be thought excluded from judicial reasoning by the First Amendment.
But what about elsewhere? In a country, for example, like the United
Kingdom or Israel, in which there is an established religion? If
religion is also an impermissible ground for adjudication even there, is
12. I do not mean that the arguments for interpretivism that I have drawn from
Rawls match my own arguments for such a conception. I mean only to show the
bearing of Rawls's work on this central question of jurisprudence. But, at least on
one interpretation of the basic structure of Rawls's argument from the original
position, his arguments are in fact not very far from my own. I believe that integrity
expresses the right view of equal citizenship: Principles applied to one person must be
applied to others unless clearly directed otherwise by competent institutions. In my
view, some idea of equality of that sort provides at least part of the set of ideas that
the heuristic device of the original position is best understood to model and enforce.
However, in footnote 19 to his article, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical,
Rawls considers and rejects my interpretation. See John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical, in Collected Papers 388, 400 n.19 (Samuel Freeman ed.,
1999).
13. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 276-312 (1986).
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this constraint ad hoc to religion? Or does it follow as only one case
from some more general principle of political morality? What about
arguments of moral philosophy, for example? May a judge properly
appeal in his opinions to the philosophical doctrines of Immanuel
Kant or John Stuart Mill? May he appeal, as a number of American
judges have in fact done, to the philosophical writings of John
Rawls? 4 May a judge appeal to macroeconomic policy? May he
decide that one principle better justifies the legal structure as a whole
because following that principle will help control inflation or promote
savings?
Rawls's doctrine of public reason is devoted exactly to defining the
kinds of arguments that are permissible for officials in a politically
liberal community, and he insists that the doctrine applies with
particular stringency to judges. I find the doctrine of public reason
difficult to define and defend, however. I know it will be discussed in
a later panel and I look forward to the discussion, but I must try to
summarize my difficulties now. There are two ways of stating what
the doctrine requires. The first, and more basic, appeals to the
important idea of reciprocity. The doctrine permits only those
justifications that all reasonable members of the political community
can reasonably accept. The second is presumably the upshot of that
more basic test. Public reason requires officials to offer justifications
that are based on the political values of the community and not on
comprehensive religious or moral or philosophical doctrines. The
doctrine, therefore, requires judges searching for a justification of the
law's structure to avoid controversial religious, moral, or philosophical
doctrines.
I do not see, however, what the doctrine of reciprocity excludes. If
I believe that a particular controversial moral position is plainly
right-for example, that individuals ought to take charge of their own
lives and bear the financial responsibility for any mistakes they make
themselves-then how can I not believe that other people in my
community can reasonably accept the same view, whether or not it is
likely that they will accept it? Perhaps Rawls means that judges
should not appeal to ideas that some reasonable citizens could not
accept without abandoning their convictions of a certain sort-their X
convictions. But we seem to have no basis for stipulating what these
X convictions are. I accept that religious convictions are special for
several reasons. Certainly someone who believes that the religious
truth is only available through divine grace, or some other privileged
access, cannot hold that all reasonable citizens could reasonably
14. See, e.g., Uhl v. Thoroughbred Tech. and Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 985
(7th Cir. 2002) (referring to Rawls's "veil of ignorance" from A Theory of Justice);
Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting A Theory of Justice);
Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980) (same);
W. Addition Cmty. Org. v. NLRB, 485 F,2d 917,938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (same).
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embrace his own religious convictions. But Rawls offers no reason to
think that the test of reciprocity excludes any reasonable convictions
beyond religious convictions.
I have equally great difficulties with the distinction between
political values on the one hand and comprehensive moral convictions
on the other. Rawls's own conception of justice as fairness depends
critically on what seem to be controversial moral positions. The
difference principle, for example, is generated and defended in
reflective equilibrium by a set of assumptions, including assumptions
about the fundamental moral irrelevance of effort or responsibility: If
the arrangement that best maximizes the position of the worst-off
group turns out to reward slackers, that is no objection. Rawls
defends this conclusion by supposing that effort is influenced by
endowment. 5 So it is, but it is not exhausted by endowment, and the
question of how the interaction between the two is to figure seems a
mixed question of psychology and morality of just the kind that
divides different comprehensive moral views about personal
responsibility. Rawls's position is certainly controversial in our
community, and some people reject it in favor of a theory of
distributive justice that depends more on personal responsibility.
These difficulties are confirmed, I think, by Rawls's examples of the
idea of public reason in operation. He discusses the abortion
controversy on several occasions, though in each case only very
briefly. His discussion assumes that the question whether an early
fetus has rights and interests of its own, including a right to life, is a
question for a comprehensive moral or religious or philosophical
position and is not settled by any political value of a liberal
community. But how can we take a position about whether American
women have a constitutional right to abortion-how could the
Supreme Court decide Roe v. Wade6 or Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 7-without taking some position
on that comprehensive issue? There seems no default position here.
The view that a fetus does not have interests and rights of its own is as
much drawn from a comprehensive position as the view that it does,
and we cannot reach a decision about abortion without adopting one
of these two views. The Equal Protection Clause applies to all
persons, and any argument that a woman has a constitutional right to
abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy must deny that a fetus is a
"person" within the meaning of that clause. 8
15. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 6, at 274.
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
18. Some philosophers believe that a moral right to abortion can be defended
even if we assume that a fetus is a person, because even on that assumption a woman
has no moral responsibility to continue the burdens of pregnancy. For a discussion of
that suggestion, see my book, Life's Dominion 102-17 (Vintage Books 1994) (1993).
But even if we accept that view, it does not follow that a constitutional right to
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I therefore doubt that Rawls's doctrine of public reason can help us
much in filling out a conception of legality and adjudication. We must
look elsewhere. In my view, we can find the necessary constraints on
judicial argument in the conception of law that I said Rawls's general
arguments suggest: interpretivism. If we accept an interpretivist
conception, we do not need a separate doctrine like the doctrine of
public reason. Judges may not appeal to religious convictions or goals
in liberal societies because such convictions cannot figure in an overall
comprehensive justification of the legal structure of a liberal and
tolerant pluralistic community. This interpretive constraint cannot,
however, exclude moral as distinct from religious convictions. Judges
interpreting a string of cases in tort law can appeal to Rawls's theory
of justice as a ground for rejecting a utilitarian interpretation of past
decisions and doctrines in favor of an interpretation more firmly
grounded in a conception of equality. ' 9 Perhaps we'll have occasion to
pursue that suggestion in one of the later panels.
One more point: In his discussion of public reason, Rawls says that
in any case judges may not appeal to their personal moral convictions.
If that means that a judge cannot argue that one justification of past
law is superior because he happens to think so, then it is obviously
correct. A judge's intellectual biography is not a legal argument. But
if it means that a judge may not give any place to controversial moral
opinions in his judgment, because he would then be citing the moral
opinions that he but not others think right, then it states an impossible
demand. On no conception of law-positivist or interpretivist-can
judges in complex pluralistic communities acquit their institutional
responsibilities without relying on controversial moral convictions.2"
V. CONSTITUTIONALISM
The institution of judicial review, under which appointed judges
have the power to declare enactments of legislatures and other
representative institutions void because they offend constitutional
guarantees of individual rights, is often said to be anti-democratic
because it allows a few unelected and virtually unsackable lawyers to
override the considered verdicts of elected representatives. Rawls
addressed himself to that classic complaint on several occasions. He
made plain, first, that according to his favored conception of justice as
fairness, the various institutions that a community constructs at what
he calls the constitutional level, in the light of principles of justice
chosen behind the veil of ignorance, are chosen in the spirit of perfect
abortion can be defended in that way. If a state may properly treat a fetus as a
person, it may constitutionally treat it as a person toward whom a mother has a
special responsibility that excludes elective abortion.
19. See Dworkin, supra note 13, at 276-312.
20. See Dworkin, Un Pontificat Laic, in Les Entretiens de Provence: Le Juge
Dans la Socit6 Contemporaine 83 (Robert Badinter & Stephen Breyer eds., 2003).
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rather than pure procedural justice. They are chosen, that is, with an
eye to outcomes. The principles of justice establish the basic liberties
and their priority, and the question to be decided at the constitutional
stage is an instrumental one: Which scheme of institutions is best
suited to protect those liberties?
Of course, among the equal liberties that institutions must be
designed to protect are the political liberties, which include the right
to vote and to participate in politics. But, as Rawls says in Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement, these and the other basic liberties are
themselves to be seen as quasi-instrumental.21 They are justified as
essential for the development and exercise of the two fundamental
moral powers, that is, the power to form and act on a sense of justice
and to form and act on a conception of the good. This means, as I
understand it, that though people have a basic right to broadly
democratic procedures, because extensive rights to vote and
participate in politics are plainly and inescapably necessary to the
development of these moral powers, people have no basic right to any
particular form of democracy, and therefore no basic right that
democratic institutions follow any particular design or have any
particular jurisdiction. The question is rather which parliamentary
structure and jurisdiction has the best prospects of securing the other
mandated or desired outcomes.
So nothing in Rawls's general conception of justice as fairness
supports the so-called "majoritarian" objection to judicial review in its
most comprehensive form. But his theory leaves room, at the
constitutional level of construction, for the more limited objection
that in fact the American structure of constitutionalism and judicial
review cannot be justified in that instrumental way, that the basic
liberties including the political liberties would be better served by
some other arrangement, which might be pure parliamentary
sovereignty or a mixed case like that of the United Kingdom after the
enactment of the Human Rights Act, which permits Parliament to
legislate in violation of the rights the Act specifies if Parliament
clearly states its intention to do so. Though Rawls did not attempt
anything like a thorough outcome-based case for the American model
against such more majoritarian rivals, he makes several arguments
that seem to support roughly the American model. He distinguishes,
for example, between parliamentary and popular sovereignty, and
says that the American model is consistent with popular sovereignty.
That model promotes people's basic moral powers, he says, because
the people in general not only endorsed the original Constitution, but
have prompted and overseen its cardinal developments since-in the
Reconstruction period, for example, and in the New Deal. (In that
21. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 112 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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view he follows, as he says, the arguments of Bruce Ackerman.)22
Second, he points out a further way in which constitutionalism and
judicial review help rather than constrain the development of the two
moral powers. He says that the fact that the Supreme Court acts as a
forum of principle encourages and focuses public political discussion
of central moral issues.
23
I can now turn to the different issue I mentioned earlier: not the
legitimacy of judicial review, but its proper strategy. The Supreme
Court is often pressed to recognize a concrete constitutional right that
it has not recognized before, and whose standing as a right is very
much in dispute among thoughtful people in the nation. If it
recognizes and enforces that new right, its decision will be massively
resented, and its own standing and legitimacy may be called into
question. The Court faced that situation in Brown v. Board of
Education24 and the other early racial discrimination cases of the
1950s. It faced it in the school prayer cases, in the abortion cases
beginning with Roe v. Wade,2 5 and in the more recent cases about
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients.
It is widely argued that in such situations the Court ought to refuse
to recognize the new right in order to allow the political process more
time to consider the merits of the issue through local politics and
decision, which might vary across states, and which might therefore
provide a kind of experimentation in what Justice Brandeis called the
laboratories of the several states.2 6 It might do that in some cases
through its certiorari policy; it might decline to take a case that
required it to decide basic issues of individual rights because it
thought it wiser to let those issues percolate in politics further. In
most such cases, however, one or more lower courts will have spoken
to the issue in a way that requires the Supreme Court to decide
whether the Constitution grants the claimed right. In that case the
passive or cautionary strategy I described would require the court to
hold that the asserted controversial right did not exist, as it did hold,
for example, in the assisted suicide cases.
27
Rawls had himself urged the Supreme Court to recognize a limited
right to assisted suicide: He signed a brief urging that decision as an
amicus curiae, along with three others who are at this conference
22. See Bruce Ackerman, We The People (1991).
23. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
27. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997).
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today.28 But Rawls later said that the cautionary argument is what he
called a "good" argument for the decision the Court made against his
advice, and he also called it a "good" argument against the Court's
1973 decision to recognize a limited right to abortion in Roe v. Wade,29
which of course doesn't mean that he thought it finally a persuasive
argument.30  However, there seems to me a straight-forward and
powerful-even knock-down-Rawlsian argument against the
cautious view. In these contentious cases a plaintiff or group of
plaintiffs claims that some law or practice denies their basic liberties
and therefore offends the first principle of justice, which in justice as
fairness is given priority over everything else, presumably including
civil peace and quiet. Of course, any particular justice might not
believe that the targeted law or practice does deny a basic liberty. But
we must assume that Justice Rawls would be convinced by the
argument he himself put forward, for example, in the Philosophers'
Brief. We can easily see how a utilitarian who calls himself a
pragmatist might be attracted to the cautious argument. But why
should Rawls be? Why should he think that the cautious argument is
even a "good" one?
One answer might be epistemic. Perhaps Rawls thought it arguable
that a Supreme Court justice, recognizing the fearsome Burdens of
Reason, should accept that his own judgment might well be flawed,
that the political process might over some years work out a different
compromise that would be very widely accepted, and that this
compromise, if it is ever achieved, would be a more accurate or
reasonable account of the basic liberty in question than a majority of
justices could devise for themselves in advance. There are several
obvious difficulties in this answer, however, and we may expose these
using the abortion issue once again as an example.
First, it seems unlikely that a non-divisive compromise would soon
have been reached in the politics of this country. The Europeans have
by and large settled on a position that, with cosmetic formalities,
allows abortion on demand.3' This has not generated continuous
controversy there, but that is because Europe is not plagued with
fundamentalist religious movements or any serious fundamentalist
sensibility. But we are so plagued, as has once again been
28. Brief of Amici Curiae Ronald Dworkin et al., Glucksberg (No. 95-1858, 96-
110), available at 1996 WL 708956. In addition to John Rawls, the brief was signed by
Thomas Nagel, Thomas Scanlon, and myself, who are participants in this conference,
and Robert Nozick and Judith Jarvis Thomson.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. See John Rawls, Commonweal Interview with John Rawls, in John Rawls:
Collected Papers 616, 618 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
31. For an exhaustive discussion of the status of abortion law in Europe, see Inter-
Departmental Working Group on Abortion, Gov't of Ir., Green Paper on Abortion $
3.02, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/index.asp?doclD=238 (last visited Apr.
14, 2004).
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demonstrated by the recently legislated ban on so-called partial birth
abortion." The only solution that would still militant objection from
fundamentalists here would be a harsh anti-abortion regime, and that
would not be tolerable to women's movements that can be almost
equally militant. Second, even if a compromise were reached
politically that proved reasonably acceptable to all, there would be no
reason to think that this compromise would have more accurately or
reasonably identified the basic liberties in question. On the contrary,
whatever view one takes of those basic liberties, it seems likely that a
compromise would mean injustice to some. Suppose, for example,
that most people ceased much to object to anti-abortion laws in their
own states, but only because women who wanted an abortion could
conveniently travel to a nearby state in which abortion was legal.
That would deny the equal value of liberty to people too poor to
afford the various expenses of the travel.
Could Rawls have thought that it is indeterminate whether there is
a basic liberty to an abortion, or to assisted suicide, or to a prayer-free
school? If so, he might then have thought that there is a good case for
leaving such issues to politics, because politics is superior to
adjudication when quasi-pure-procedural justice is all that is anyway
on offer. But it is extremely implausible that Rawls thought that
issues like these are matters of indeterminacy, because he himself
took positions on several of these issues. Nor could he consistently
suppose (as several scholars in effect have supposed) that state-by-
state politics is a better vehicle for developing the various public
virtues he recognized than is adjudication. His argument that
Supreme Court adjudication stimulates the development of the two
moral powers seems to apply as thoroughly to divisive cases as to less
dramatic ones; indeed, more so.
Might he have appealed to the virtue of civility, arguing that it is
better not to take decisions that will seem deeply offensive to some
citizens? But these decisions will seem equally offensive to the losing
side if legislatures rather than courts impose them. In any case, this
kind of civility is aimed at a mere modus vivendi, which Rawls
rejected as inadequate, rather than at anything one might defend in
principle. Of course, if the authority of the Supreme Court or of the
constitutional arrangement as a whole were actually at stake, that
would be different. We could understand the wisdom of a cautious
counsel in that case: Better to ignore the rights of a few people than
to sacrifice the system that protects everyone's rights in the long run.
But, of course, that is not the situation. Contrary to Justice
Frankfurter's worries, the Court's authority survived Brown v. Board
of Education3 3 and the miscegenation cases; 34 it has also survived Roe
32. Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 3(a), 117 Stat. 1206 (2003).
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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v. Wade 5 and the school prayer decisions.36 It could have survived
deciding for a limited right to assisted suicide. Indeed, I'm tempted to
think that since it has apparently survived the shame of Bush v.
Gore,37 it can survive almost anything.
VI. TRUTH AND OBJECTIVITY
I want finally to notice, though I must do so very briefly, the last
aspect of Rawls's views that I cited as particularly important for legal
theory. It is a frequent objection to celebrations of the rule of law that
legal judgments, particularly in hard cases, cannot be reports of any
objective truth, but simply express the speaker's psychological state of
approval or disapproval. This is a familiar skeptical view about
morality and other departments of value, but it is of particular
practical importance in law, because it is thought to provide a
substantive argument in various controversies: for example, about
whether people have a moral duty to obey the law, or whether judicial
review of majoritarian legislation is defensible.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls identified a conception of objectivity
that he believed suitable to political claims, and much of what he said
holds for controversial claims of law as well. He insisted that
objectivity, in the sense he defined, does not depend on any
assumption that political or legal reasoning is a case of perception,
that is, that a political or legal claim can be objectively true only when
the belief that it is true is caused by the situation it reports. Legal
facts are not in any causal relationship with lawyers' central nervous
system. But why should it follow that a controversial proposition of
law-that the manufacturers of a dangerous medicine are legally
responsible for injuries in proportion to their market share, for
example-cannot be objectively true? Whether a proposition claims
objective truth depends on its content. It claims objective truth if it
claims that its truth is independent of anyone's belief or preference:
that manufacturers would be liable, on the present state of the law,
even if lawyers didn't think so. That is all the claim of objectivity
means. Whether that claim is successful depends on the legal
arguments we can offer for it, that is, on our reasons for thinking that
manufacturers would still be liable even if lawyers didn't think so. If
we think that our reasons for thinking that are good reasons, then we
must also think that the proposition that the manufacturers are liable
is objectively true.
Objectivity so understood doesn't depend on a metaphysical
34. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
37. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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assumption that seems popular among some so-called moral realists.
They think that a proposition can be objectively true only if, in
addition to the substantive reasons we can offer for embracing the
proposition, the proposition also has a ground in some kind of reality
that goes beyond these reasons. They are wrong: Substantive reasons
are enough. But they must not be isolated reasons. Our arguments
for objectivity are sufficient only if they are sufficiently systematic and
mutually and reciprocally examined. Rawls puts that crucial point this
way:
Political constructivism does not look for something for the
reasonableness of the statement that slavery is unjust to consist in, as
if the reasonableness of it needed some kind of grounding. We may
accept provisionally, though with confidence, certain considered
judgments as fixed points, as what we take as basic facts, such as
slavery is unjust. But we have a fully philosophical political
conception only when such facts are coherently connected together
by concepts and principles acceptable to us on due reflection.
38
I do not agree with all of Rawls's discussion of objectivity. Indeed, I
think some of it is shown to be unnecessary and unjustified by the
rest-his view that we cannot properly claim objectivity for a domain
unless we can explain what we take to be error in that domain in a
non-question-begging way, for example. But I commend his general
discussion of objectivity to lawyers who hope to understand what their
arguments are really about.
VII. CONFESSION
Some of you will have noticed a certain congruence between the
positions in legal theory I say Rawls's arguments support and those I
have myself tried to defend, and you may think this no accident. So I
offer you a confession, but with no apology. The work of
philosophical icons is rich enough to allow appropriation through
interpretation. Each of us has his or her own Immanuel Kant, and
from now on we will struggle, each of us, for the benediction of John
Rawls. And with very good reason. As this conference shows, after
all the books, all the footnotes, all the wonderful discussions, we are
only just beginning to grasp how much we have to learn from that
man.
38. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 23, at 124.
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